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I. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
While appellants have always conceded that, when the listing agreements were 
initially signed, they did not include detailed descriptions of the properties to be sold, there 
are still genuine issues of material fact as to whether the parties supplemented or 
amended the contracts to provide those descriptions. On page 7 of their brief, respondents 
assert: 
It is also clear from the record that CBI at no time agreed to add legal descriptions 
of the Agreements subsequent to their execution. 
This claim is predicated on respondents' statement of the facts at R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, 
paragraphs 9 and 10. However, it ignores the evidence submitted by appellants in 
opposition to this factual claim. Specifically, Callies testified in her affidavit that, after the 
brokerage contracts had been signed: 
The legal description of the parameters of the property had been prepared 
by the project engineer prior to the execution of the Listing Agreement, the final plat 
recorded on April 11, 2006, and after that date, prior to its renewal and extension 
on February 28, 2006, the individual legal descriptions for the units were provided 
by George P. O'Neal and also incorporated within the listing. 
R., Exhibits.8 and 9, page 3. 
In other words, while the parties knew what property had to be sold at the time that the 
contracts were executed, specific descriptions of the individual parcels of that property that 
had to be sold were not available until a later time. When those descriptions became 
available, they were added to the agreement. If accepted by a jury, this evidence would 
permit the inference that the original contracts had expressly been supplemented or 
modified to include those specific descriptions. 
Alternatively, Callies also testified in her affidavit that O'Neal and she had followed 
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the same procedure utilized in the case at bar on a number of earlier projects, including 
Concord Commons, Boomer, Fenway Park Fourplexes and Townhomes, Pheasant Run, 
Lake Forest, Hampton Estates and Foxboro. R., Exhibits 8 and 9, page 3. This testimony, 
if accepted by the jury, would permit the inference that the parties had implicitly 
supplemented or modified the original agreements by following the course of practice that 
had successfully been utilized in the previous projects to permit sales of individual parcels 
within the projects, bring cash into the project and then use that cash to complete it, 
Parties are free to amend, vary or modify their contracts, Silver Syndicafe v. 
Sunshine Mining Co., 101 ldaho 226,611 P.2d 101 1 (1979), and consent to modification 
may be implied from a course of conduct consistent with the asserted modification. Jones 
v. Micron Technologies, lnc., 129 ldaho 241, 923 P.2d 486 (Ct.App. 1996). 
In this connection, it is significant that, in the case at bar, respondents gave no 
notice that they did not propose to honor the agreement established by the parties' course 
of practice with each other. It was not until appellants had sold the property that an issue 
was raised regarding the sufficiency of the original agreements: 
There had not been any issues with the legal description or the seller named 
for the previous year and half that they had been going under purchase and sale 
contracts while I had been marketing them. It wasn't until six months after and just 
before closing the buildings that he claimed the addresses were incorrect and that 
the wrong seller was named on the listing agreement and purchase and sale 
contracts. 
R., Exhibits 8 and 9, page 4 
Whether the finder of fact would view the supplementation or modification of the 
original agreements to be an express addition or change to the original agreement as 
opposed to an implied one, or vice versa, is of no import to the present proceedings. What 
REPLY BRIEF - 2 
is important is that the finder of fact could rationally make either choice, depending upon 
its perception of the evidence as a whole. It therefore cannot be resolved as a matter of 
law on summary judgment. 
None of the authorities cited by respondents challenges the principle that parties are 
free to amend their agreements and that such an amendment may be implied through their 
conduct. Therefore, they are consistent with the foregoing analysis. White v. Rehn, 103 
ldaho I ,  644 P.2d 323 (1 982), is a case involving the transfer of real property, rather than 
a brokerage agreement, a fact that respondents ignore in their argument to the court. 
Respondents cite it for the proposition that parol evidence is not admissible fo clarify the 
terms of an agreement which is ambiguous due to a lack of valid legal description. In 
White, Rehn had agreed to sell 960 acres out of a 9,000 acre parcel of land. An earnest 
money agreement was prepared which contained a description which failed to pinpoint 
exactly which 960 acres were to be transferred. Under these circumstances, the court 
concluded that the parol evidence was intended to supply the property description, which 
it held to violate the statute of frauds. However, the court did not state that parol evidence 
may never be used: 
Par01 evidence may be resorted to for the purpose of identifying the description 
contained in the writing, with its location upon the ground, but not for the purpose 
of ascertaining and locating the land about which the particular parties negotiated, 
and supplying a description thereof which may have been omitted from the writing. 
103 ldaho at 3 citing Allen v. Kitchen, 16 ldaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909). 
In the case at bar, the parol evidence is not intended to supply the property 
descriptions, which were provided by the plats described in Callies' affidavits. Instead, the 
parol evidence spoke to how those descriptions came to be incorporated into the 
brokerage agreement between the parties, which is entirely consistent with the court's 
remark in Whife that par01 evidence may be used to "identify" the description contained in 
the agreement. 
Moreover, White does not stand for the proposition that a legal description sufficient 
to transfer property is required to enforce a contract for commissions due on the sale of 
that property. The agreement between appellants and respondents identified the projects 
which were subject to the commission agreement with the understanding that the legal 
descriptions to the property would be provided at a later date. Nothing in White precludes 
an enforcement of the agreement between Callies and CBI. 
Respondents cite Good v. Hansen, 11 0 Idaho 953,719 P.2d 121 3 (Ct.App.1986), 
for the proposition that a party has the right to rescind an agreement that is unenforceable. 
In that case, Good had assigned a money judgment to Hansen with the understanding that 
the proceeds would be used as a down payment for the purchase of Hansen's house. 
Hansen failed to deliverthe deed and Good sought rescission of the agreement for failure 
of consideration. Hansen's arguments that Good had other remedies besides rescission 
failed because of the statute of frauds. 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that appellants performed their obligations under 
the brokerage contracts at issue. The rescission now before this court was therefore not 
predicated upon a lack of consideration. It was, instead, predicated solely on the statute 
of frauds, which was not the issue before the court in Good, which therefore provides no 
support for respondents' position in this case. 
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11. NEITHER IDAHO CODE 554-2050 NOR GARNER V. BARTSCHI SUPPORTS 
RESPONDENTS' POSITION IN THIS CASE. 
Respondents argue that ldaho Code 354-2050 renders the listing agreements 
unenforceable and further argue that Garner v. Barfschi, 139 ldaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031 
(2003) supports this conclusion. Neither argument is justified. 
ldaho Code 354-2050 requires that brokerage agreements be in writing and that 
they contain a "legally enforceable description of the property". I. C. 354-2050(1)(b). 
Respondents read into this language the corollary that the legal description must meet the 
requirements of ldaho Code 39-503 as opposed to those of ldaho Code $9-508, because 
ldaho Code 354-2050 is more specific than ldaho Code 39-508. Respondents Brief, p. 12. 
That, however, is a non sequitur. While ldaho Code 354-2050 is indeed more detailed 
than ldaho Code 39-508, the added detail speaks to matters other than the legal 
description required by ldaho Code 39-508. There is nothing in ldaho Code 354-2050 that 
clearly indicates the legislature's intent to alter the interpretation that this court had 
previously placed upon ldaho Code $9-508. Under those circumstances, the authority 
cited on pages 15 through 21 of appellants' opening brief is controlling. A "legally 
enforceable" property description under ldaho Code 39-508 requires only that the 
descriptions be sufficient to show that there is no misunderstanding between the seller and 
broker as to the property involved and that the descriptions be sufficient to enable the 
broker to locate the property, show it and point out its boundaries to prospective 
purchasers. The same standard is appropriate in this case ldaho Code §54-2050 is inpari 
maferia with ldaho Code 39-508. MafferofAdopfion of Chancy, 126 ldaho 554,887 P.2d 
1061 (1995). 
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Respondents also read into ldaho Code §54-2050 a requirement that the "legally 
enforceable description" must be contained in the listing agreement at the time the 
agreement is executed. There is nothing in the statute which requires, or even addresses, 
how or when the description must be inserted into the contract. Nothing in the statute 
precludes the parties from relying upon a number of documents executed at one time, or 
series of documents incorporated into the agreement over time, if that is how they choose 
to satisfy the terms of the statute, so long as the description is a part of the agreement 
when the broker makes her claim for a commission. 
Respondents also cite Garnerv. Bartschi, 179 ldaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003), in 
support of their position that ldaho Code §54-2050 requires a legally enforceable 
description sufficient to transfer property under ldaho Code §9-503. This claim fails, 
because neither party in Garner argued that ldaho Code $9-508 was the controlling 
statute. Therefore, the court never had occasion to discuss either that statute or Central 
ldaho Agency v. Turner, 92 ldaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968), the primary authority on 
which appellants rely in asserting that the descriptions in the brokerage agreements were 
sufficient in this case. 
Gameris to the case at bar as Griggs v. Nash, 11 6 ldaho 228,775 P.2d 120 (1 989), 
was to Fuller v. Wolfers, 119 ldaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991). In Griggs, the court upheld 
an award of attorney fees in a legal malpractice action under ldaho Code §12-120(3), 
which provides for attorney fees in any "commercial transaction". Two years later, in 
another action for legal malpractice, the court held that, although the contract between 
attorney and client was a commercial transaction, an action for malpractice was properly 
characterized as a tort claim. For that reason, the court disallowed a recovery of attorney 
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fees under ldaho Code 312-120(3). The court explained these apparently contradictory 
conclusions by observing that, in Griggs, neither party had presented the issue of whether 
a malpractice action fell within ldaho Code 312-120(3). By parity of reasoning, Garner is 
not controlling in this case, where appellants have consistently relied upon ldaho Code 39- 
508 and Central ldaho Agency v. Turnerthroughout the proceedings and where Garner 
does not address that issue. 
The application of Garnerto the instant case is further rendered inapposite due to 
the circumstances of this case, which are distinguishable from those of Garner. In Garner, 
no property was transferred. In the instant case, property descriptions sufficient to satisfy 
both Idaho Code 39-503 and 39-508 were supplied, and a series of transactions actually 
closed. The holding in Garner therefore does not apply to the facts of this case. 
Ill. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE 
DOCTRINES OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE AND ESTOPPEL. 
In the case at bar, the partial performance by appellants necessarily remedied the 
alleged deficiency asserted by respondents to defeat the claims for commissions. It is 
undisputed in this case that, on account of appellants' efforts, respondents were able to 
close a large number of agreements for the purchase and sale of real property. This could 
not have occurred in the absence of property descriptions that were sufficient to meet the 
requirements of ldaho Code 39-503. Thus, appellants' performance of their obligations 
under the brokerage agreements justifies the application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel. 
Respondents cite Weatherhead v. Cooney, 32 ldaho 127, 180 P.2d 60 (1919), for 
the proposition that "equitable defenses do not apply" to actions to enforce listing 
agreements, Respondent's Brief, page 17, claiming that Garnermandates the conclusion 
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that Central Idaho Agency v. Turnerhas been overruled. Weatherhead involved an action 
to recover the value for services rendered in finding a purchaser for mining claims. The 
case involved a statute similar to §9-508, which required that any contract for the payment 
of a real estate commission on the sale of a mining claim to be in writing. In Weafherhead, 
there was no writing of any kind to support the claim for the commission. Not surprisingly, 
the court held that part performance could not take the case out of the statute frauds 
because to do so would render the statute a nullity. 
It is not clear from the opinion in Weafherhead whether defendant conceded, as a 
matter of fact, that there was a brokerage agreement and used the statute of frauds to 
defeat an otherwise valid claim, or whether the existence of the oral agreement was denied 
and the statute of frauds was merely the defense on which judgment happened to have 
been rendered pursuant to defendant's demurrer. Thus, it is not clearwhetherthe plaintiff 
in Weatherhead was simply an officious intermeddler or whether he had any reasonable 
expectation of being paid for work actually authorized by the defendant. 
Weatherhead is therefore factually distinguishable from the case at bar, because 
in this case it is undisputed that there were, in fact, written brokerage agreements between 
the parties. There can therefore be no doubt, but that respondents agreed that appellants 
were authorized to sell the property affected by the brokerage contracts. The only alleged 
shortcoming in the written documents is the absence of the property descriptions at the 
time that the documents were signed. However, even at that time, the parties involved, 
the projects to be subject to the agreement, the length of time, the amounts of the 
commission and all of the other essentials to the contract were clearly in writing. Moreover, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to appellants, the property descriptions were 
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incorporated into the contract after the signing of the document by express or implied 
agreement of the parties, thus enabling respondents to close the purchase and sale 
agreements negotiated by appellants. Thus, the performance of the contracts necessarily 
remedied the alleged deficiency and the doctrine of quasi estoppel should be applied. 
This conclusion is buttressed by Central ldaho Agency v. Turner, one of the cases 
disparaged by respondents as deviating from the Weatherhead doctrine. ldaho law in 
1968 was not nearly so harsh as it was in 1919, reflected by the fact that this court, in 
Central ldaho Agency v. Turner, overruled inconsistent earlier authority. 
The situation in the instant case differs substantially from that in Letfunich v. Key 
Bank, 141 ldaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005). Lettunich involved ldaho Code $9-505(5) 
which requires that a promise or commitment to lend money in the principal amount of 
$50,000.00 or more shall be made in writing or the agreement is invalid. Lettunich had 
contacted Key Bank for the purpose of obtaining the $500,000.00 guarantee to purchase 
cattle. Lettunich testified that Key Bank's representative had orally committed to provide 
the financing in the form of a cattle term loan. Based on that representation, Lettunich 
purchased over $400,000.00 in cattle. After the purchase, Key Bank advised Lettunich that 
it could not extend the credit that he needed. The court in Lettunich noted that to be 
specifically enforceable by the doctrine of part performance, an oral agreement must be 
complete, definite and certain in all of its material terms or contain provisions which are 
capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty. The court in that case held: 
Even though it could be inferred that Lettunich partially performed by 
purchasing cattle at the sale, there is no evidence in the record of a complete and 
enforceable agreement. For example, there is no indication of the amount of the 
loan, the interest rate, the disbursement schedule, the terms of repayment, the 
security for the loan, or the parties' rights after default. While none of these terms 
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individually may be determinative, the lack of all of them in this case makes the oral 
agreement to lend money vague, incomplete and unenforceable. Consequently, the 
doctrine of part performance does not apply to this case. 
Letfunich is, in any event, a case of promissory estoppel, rather than quasi estoppel. 
Respondents gloss over this difference in their analysis of the decision. The fact is, 
however, that the elements of promissory estoppel are significantly different than those of 
quasi estoppel. Compare Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L. L.C., 138 ldaho 27, 56 
P.3d 1277 (2002), with City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 
ldaho 145,879 P.2d 1078 (1994). In Letfunich, the case of promissory estoppel, the bank 
received nothing from Lettunich by reason of its promise. In this case, in which quasi 
estoppel is involved, respondents received significant benefits from the closing of contracts 
negotiated by appellants for their benefit. 
Respondent's reliance on Garneris also misplaced. Garner discussed the concepts 
of part performance and quasi-estoppel in the context of the attempt to avoid the unjust 
results of the statute of frauds. The court noted that quasi-estoppel prevents a party from 
reaping an unconscionable advantage or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage 
upon another by changing positions. However, in that case, the court found that the buyer 
had not suffered an unconscionable disadvantage and that the seller had not obtained any 
advantage other than remaining on the property, which is where she started in any event. 
Hence, she had gained nothing from the transaction itself. In the instant case, respondents 
have been benefitted by the significant profits they received in the sale of the property. 
Furthermore, appellants have also suffered unconscionable detriments. 
While respondents argue that "there is no evidence the record of the funds 
purportedly expended by the appellants in reliance on the agreements", Respondent's 
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brief, page 21, this only creates an issue of fact, because the affidavit of Tricia Callies 
establishes that respondents allowed her and her company to invest substantial amounts 
of time and effort into the marketing and sale of the properties at issue. Callies testified 
that she is due commissions of between $235,900.00 and $421,800.00 for the Charter 
Pointe listing (record, Exhibit 8, paragraph 10) and $546,600.00 for the Silver Oaks listing 
(record, Exhibit 9, paragraph 14). In addition to having to pass up another opportunities, 
Callies incurred $97,219.26 as direct costs due to her marketing efforts (record, Exhibit 8, 
paragraphs 10 and 12, and Exhibit 9, paragraphs 14 and 15). 
In the instant appeal, there exists a written contract which set forth all of the 
elements of the contract as between the parties. By their performance of her obligations 
pursuant to the agreement, appellants remedied the only shortcoming in the contract that 
has been identified by respondents. Respondents reaped the benefits of appellants' 
performance and should be estopped, under the circumstances of this case, from reliance 
upon the statute of frauds to defeat appellants' claim for compensation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in this document, the court should reverse the summary 
judgment granted by the district court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 2008. 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
/? 
REPLY BRIEF - 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8Ih day of December, 2008, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing document were sewed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to the offices indicated below: 
T.J. Angstman 4 , s .  Mail 
Erin Wynne [ I  Overnight Delivery 
Angstman, Johnson & Assoc., PLLC [ ] Hand Delivery 
3649 Lakeharbor Ln. [ ] Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
REPLY BRIEF - 12 
